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In the minds ofmany observers, the phrase
"risk assessment" conjures up a specific and
scientifically suspect methodology that is
applied by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and other regulatory
bodies to examine questions about risks to
human health that can not be fully
answered using traditional scientific meth-
ods. More specifically, the phrase is often
thought to refer to the particular methods
and assumptions EPA applies to extrapo-
late from sets of human or (more com-
monly) animal carcinogenicity data,
obtained under conditions of relatively
intense exposures to the carcinogen, to
develop quantitative estimates of health
risks that are said to be caused by the car-
cinogen at the much less intense exposures
experienced by most human populations.
Ifthey think the risks projected using these
methods are excessive (according to criteria
set forth in the law under which the car-
cinogen is regulated), the EPA and its sister
regulatory agencies (FDA, OSHA, CPSC)
will make what is called a risk management
decision to bring about reductions in the
projected risks (1).
Although this view of risk assessment
captures much of its present practice and
application, it is deficient in two important
respects. First, it incorrectly assumes that
the specific risk assessment methodology
used by the regulatory agencies fully
defines its practice, and second, it fails to
consider the possibility that risk assessment
can serve much broader and socially useful
purposes than regulation of carcinogens
and other toxic substances ofindustrial ori-
gin. I attempt here to stimulate thinking
about possible broader uses of risk assess-
ment in identifying and solving public
health problems of many types and also
suggest how its practice can serve as a high-
ly systematic guide to public health
research. I also attempt to make the case
that a less restrictive view of how risk
assessment should be practiced needs to be
encouraged; indeed, it is necessary that we
change our thinking about the content and
practice of risk assessment if it is to serve
broader purposes.
I begin with a brief review ofhow and
why risk assessment entered the lives of
regulatory agencies and ofthe reasons that
drove the regulators to adopt specific
methods and assumptions. I go on to dis-
cuss current practices and the scientific
limitations that attend them. This discus-
sion sets the stage for an elaboration ofmy
views regarding possible broader applica-
tions ofrisk assessment and ofthe method-
ological issues that need to be explored to
realize its full public health potential. My
purpose here is only to provoke such explo-
ration, and so I do not deal with detailed
methodological.questions.
These proposals to enlarge the practice
and scope of risk assessment are based on
the premise that public health resources
should be devoted to reducing risks in at
least rough proportion to the toll they take
on human health and that risk assessment,
properly conceived and practiced, is the
appropriate tool for assigning risks their
rightful order. Seen from this perspective
risk assessment should be a principal com-
ponent of public health programs every-
where, both to guide research and the allo-
cation of research funds and to inform
decisions about improving public health. I
return to these ultimate issues in the clos-
ing sections ofthe paper.
Origins and Evolution ofthe
Practice ofChemical Risk
Assessment
Although safety engineers and radiation
biologists had been practicing risk assess-
ment, or something akin to it, for several
decades before the 1970s, it was later that
federal regulatory agencies began to offi-
cially incorporate procedures they referred
to as risk assessment (2). They did so not
because of a scientifically driven impera-
tive, but because many of the laws they
were charged with enforcing required the
agencies to answer questions for which
directly relevant empirical evidence could
not be developed. The typical problem
faced by regulators involved situations in
which large numbers ofpeople, sometimes
nearly the entire population, were or could
be exposed to relatively low levels ofchem-
ical substances (in consumer products and
medicines, the workplace, and in air,
water, foods, and soils) that had been iden-
tified as hazardous to health (toxic), but
only under conditions of relatively intense
exposures. The regulators' problems were
worsened by the fact that most of the sci-
entific data used to identify the toxic prop-
erties of chemicals, especially those of a
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chronic nature, involved studies in experi-
mental animals, typically rodents. Thus,
regulatory officials were faced with two
fundamental questions which, in most
cases, could not be fully answered using
available scientific methods: 1) what risks
to human health exist in the range of
chemical exposures below the relatively
intense and narrow range under which
risks could be directly measured? and 2)
what could be said about risks to human
health when experimental animals were
the only subjects in which risks to health
had been measured?
These questions were not new in the
1970s; indeed, regulators and others
involved in setting or recommending lim-
its on human exposures to chemical sub-
stances had developed practical methods
for dealing with them nearly three decades
earlier. These individuals did not refer to
their practices as risk assessment, and, in
fact, they did not seem to recognize the
risk assessment-risk management distinc-
tion that is now seen as important in the
standard-setting process. These early prac-
titioners assumed that all chemical sub-
stances, natural and synthetic, would pose
some type of health hazard if exposures
exceeded a so-called threshold level and
that, with some important qualifications,
experimental animals could be used to
identify the types of hazards a substance
Address correspondence to J.V. Rodricks, ENVI-
RON International Corporation, 4350 North
Fairfax Drive, Suite 300, Arlington, VA 22203
USA.
Received 18 October 1993; accepted 24 January
1994.
Environmental Health Perspectives 258II
might pose to people and the conditions
under which these toxic hazards might
exist (3). So-called safety factors were
introduced to compensate for uncertainties
in the toxicology data and in their applica-
bility to large human populations, and rec-
ommended or required limits on human
exposures were usually set at some small
fraction of the exposure levels that could
be clearly documented as hazardous. It was
then assumed that as long as human expo-
sures did not exceed the "safe" levels, the
hazardous properties of chemical sub-
stances would not be expressed. For many
types ofchemical toxicity, this practice, in
somewhat refined form, continues to this
day (3-5).
Although there are technical difficulties
with this approach to dealing with low
exposure risks oftoxicity, they are not rele-
vant to the present discussion. 'What is rel-
evant is the fact that, during the late 1960s
and early 1970s, federal regulatory agencies
had to come to grips with an increasingly
important problem for which many scien-
tists considered the safety factor approach
to be inappropriate, even dangerous. This
was the problem of chemicals that had
been shown under certain conditions to
increase the risk of cancers in humans or
experimental animals-substances opera-
tionally referred to as carcinogens. As with
other forms of toxicity, cancer risks could
normally be directly measured only under
highly restricted conditions, typically in
groups of intensely exposed individuals
(those who worked directly with the chem-
ical or those receiving high doses ofcertain
drugs) or in similarly exposed laboratory
animals.
As early as the 1940s, some scientists
had come to the view that chemical car-
cinogens caused damage by biological
mechanisms that were ofa radically differ-
ent kind from those that produced other
forms of toxicity (6,2). In part borrowing
their ideas from recent developments in
the biology of radiation-induced cancers,
these scientists put forth what is referred to
as the "no-threshold" hypothesis. This
hypothesis holds that any exposure to a
carcinogen that reaches and interacts with
a critical biological target can increase the
probability (the risk) of cancer develop-
ment. If the no-threshold hypothesis were
true, then it would be inappropriate to use
a scheme for establishing safe limits that
assumes the existence of a threshold dose.
The no-threshold hypothesis had its earli-
est and most extreme influence on public
policy in the development of the 1958
Food and Color Additive Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
which include the Delaney Clause. The
Delaney Clause forbids the intentional and
direct addition of any human or animal
carcinogen to food on the ground that no
safe level ofhuman exposure can be identi-
fied for such an agent (8). (These same
amendments allow the addition of sub-
stances causing any other type of toxicity
to food, as long as the expected human
intake is below the toxicity level by a suffi-
ciently wide margin; i.e., they implicitly
adopt the threshold hypothesis.) Although
no other laws dealing with environmental
chemicals, with the possible exception of
the Safe Drinking Water Act, take such an
extreme position on carcinogens, many
single them out for special treatment (5,_l.
The cumulative effects ofseveral inter-
related activities began to be felt in the
1970s and forced regulatory agencies to
deal with carcinogens more directly and
aggressively than they had up until that
time (2,5). In the years before the 1970s,
public health and regulatory officials had
banned the commercial uses of a few
chemical carcinogens and had called for
exposure reductions for a few others, usual-
ly to concentrations that were just below
the detection limits ofavailable methods of
chemical analysis (the "out-of-sight, out-
of-mind" approach). Many carcinogens
found in the environment were simply
ignored because there was no obvious
means to cope with them.
By the early 1970s this state of affairs
came to be seen as unacceptable. The rate
at which commercially important chemi-
cals were identified as carcinogens, mostly
through animal tests, had increased rapidly
during the 1960s and increased even more
rapidly into the 1970s. Moreover, analyti-
cal chemists had been improving their
detection capabilities with even greater
speed and had discovered more chemicals
in more environmental media at lower and
lower levels. And, as mentioned earlier, a
spate ofnew laws enacted in the same time
period calling for strict controls on human
exposures to potentially dangerous chemi-
cals forced regulators to confront these
emerging facts (1).
It was generally assumed that with few
exceptions, such as intentionally intro-
duced food additives, the imposition of
outright bans on the production and use of
many commercially important products
because of their carcinogenic properties
was not a viable approach, and it was cer-
tainly not feasible for many industrial by-
products and wastes. Turning to the ana-
lytical chemist for decision-making was not
useful if the "below detection limit"
approach to standard setting was to be
used because detection limits could contin-
ually be reduced. Such an unstable ap-
proach to setting limits on exposures was
additionally burdened with the awkward
fact that the magnitudes ofthe health risks
associated with carcinogens are surely
unrelated to the abilities of analytical
chemists to detect them (10). For these
and other reasons, regulatory agencies such
as EPA and FDA began in the mid-1970s
to adopt methods that had been discussed
in the scientific literature for assessing low-
dose risks from chemical carcinogens
(7,11,12).
The regulators recognized that several
assumptions, some unsupported by any
direct empirical evidence, had to be
employed to assess carcinogenic risks. The
nature ofthe dose-risk relation at low doses
had to be assumed because it could not be
uncovered empirically. In many cases sever-
al different sets of animal data had to be
evaluated and decisions made about which
set, if any, applied to human beings. The
particular measure ofdose at which humans
and rodents could be said to be at equal risk
also had to be assumed. The list ofassump-
tions needed to complete a risk assessment
could be quite long (1).
Regulators recognized the need for
assumptions and noted that to achieve
consistency, they would adopt specific sets
of assumptions that would be generically
applied to all carcinogens. The agencies
specified, for example, that animal evi-
dence of carcinogenicity would be recog-
nized as useful for assessing human risk.
They specified that carcinogenic risks
would be estimated using the most sensi-
tive animal model and linear, no-thresh-
old, dose-risk models, and that statistical
upper confidence limits would be used
rather than best estimates. These and sever-
al other assumptions (regarding, for exam-
ple, the methods used to estimate the mag-
nitude ofpossible human exposures to car-
cinogens) were adopted as what the
National Academy ofSciences, in an influ-
ential 1983 report, termed "science policy"
choices in risk assessment (1,2,12). When
science cannot provide definitive answers,
policies would be imposed because not
doing so would result in socially unaccept-
able conclusions-that nothing at all could
be said about the risks to human health
that might obtain at low doses (10). Better
to use such default assumptions, as long as
they were not clearly inconsistent with cur-
rent scientific knowledge, than to adopt
approaches to regulation that took no
account of the possible magnitude of the
health problem or to admit such ignorance
of health consequences that no regulation
could bejustified (1).
Once defaults were adopted and low-
dose risks from carcinogens were estimated,
risk managers stepped in to define the
ranges ofrisk that could be considered suffi-
ciently low to protect public health.
Decisions about "acceptable," "tolerable,"
or "insignificant" levels ofrisk became com-
mon and brought new controversies (11).
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Regulatory Practices and Their
Limitations
The regulatory practice of risk assessment
is characterized by the use of specific
default assumptions that are designed to
allow the completion of risk assessments
when data and knowledge are incomplete,
as of course they always are. Although the
agencies have acknowledged that, in cer-
tain cases, data may become available to
show that one or more of the default
assumptions is not supportable, and that
alternative assumptions have greater scien-
tific merit, there are very few cases (and
none ofmajor significance) in which regu-
lators have found the data supporting an
alternative assumption sufficiently certain
to warrant a departure from the default.
Perhaps the reluctance of regulators to
abandon standard default assumptions is
explained by the fact that most ofthe alter-
native assumptions that have so far been
suggested result in a conclusion that the
chemical under evaluation carries less risk
than is suggested when the regulatory
defaults are employed. This observation is
explained by the fact that the standard sets
of default assumptions were selected by
regulators to ensure (to the extent this
could be plausibly guessed at) that risks
would not be underestimated-in unfortu-
nate but widely used parlance, the default
assumptions are said to be conservative.
Moving away from the standard default
assumptions could thus lead to a potential-
ly dangerous underestimation of human
risk ifthe basis for doing so were incorrect,
so regulators have sought a high degree of
scientific certainty in the data brought for-
ward to support alternative assumptions in
risk assessment (13,14).
Because achieving a high degree ofsci-
entific certainty in matters of this type is
rare (and regulators have not specified the
degree ofcertainty that they would like to
see achieved), the regulatory default
assumptions, most of which were adopted
in the 1970s and which have undergone
little change since, have effectively become
standardized.
Criticisms ofregulatory risk assessment
practice, which range from the uninformed
to the highly thoughtful, arose on almost
the first day regulators engaged in it. Many
of these, especially in the early days, chal-
lenged the very idea that decisions should
be based on the notion that there was some
level ofacceptable risk, and argued that the
only appropriate goal was no risk. These
types of challenges reflect fundamental
philosophical differences regarding how
risk-free we should or can seek to make our
environment and are not of interest here.
What is ofinterest are those criticisms that
have been directed at the practice of risk
assessment.
Most of this criticism falls into two
broad categories. One pertains to what
many perceive as the excessive conser-
vatism ofthe standard default assumptions.
It is argued, most often and for obvious
reasons by those whose products, emis-
sions, and wastes are under regulatory chal-
lenge, that the cumulative effect of adopt-
ing many such assumptions results not
only in assurance that risk is not underesti-
mated, but guarantees that risks are greatly
overestimated. These critics ask regulators
to adopt default assumptions of less
extreme nature to avoid such undesirable
outcomes (15,16). Some criticisms have
entered from the opposite direction; the
prominent one is that regulatory risk
assessments ofcarcinogens take no account
of the possibility of sensitive subpopula-
tions, but such criticisms have been less
common (17).
The second group ofcritics argues that
regulators are too reluctant to abandon
default assumptions when data are avail-
able to show that alternatives have greater
scientific merit. Instead of seeking the
phantom goal ofscientific certainty before
opting to depart from standard assump-
tions, regulators should, these critics argue,
choose on a chemical-specific basis to con-
sider all those assumptions that have some
degree of scientific support. These critics
do not ask the regulators to ignore uncer-
tainties, but rather urge that all available
scientific data be used, that the full range
of risks that can be inferred from these
data be presented and, if possible, that
those risks having the greatest scientific
support be highlighted. When presented
with the results of such a risk assessment,
risk managers-those who need to decide
whether and to what degree risks need to
be reduced-are free to adopt more or less
conservative approaches depending on the
context of their decision-making and the
requirements ofapplicable laws (18). Ifthe
context requires a high degree ofrisk aver-
sion, policy makers can base their decisions
on the high end of the risk range, while
acknowledging that other (lower) estimates
may be equally well or even better support-
ed. Other contexts for decision-making
may result in the use of other sets of
assumptions and the risks derived from
them.
Critics ofregulatory practices who pro-
mote this approach also argue that it mini-
mizes the role of the risk assessor in ulti-
mate questions of policy. Under this
approach, risk assessors are not asked to
discard data because they have judged
them to be "too uncertain" to use in deci-
sion-making, nor have they been forced to
constrain their choices of assumptions so
that risk managers are presented with only
a limited portion of the range ofrisks that
might plausibly be inferred from available
data and basic scientific understanding.
Decisions regarding the degree of conser-
vatism ultimately to be adopted are placed
where they should be-squarely in the
hands of policy makers (14,16). The
approach to risk assessment favored by this
second group of critics is the one I advo-
cate below, as I turn to a discussion of
broader uses ofthis tool in the formulation
ofpublic health policies.
Although, as I have said, the critics of
regulatory practice have so far had little
practical effect, there are signs that EPA
and other regulatory agencies are seeking
ways to make fuller use ofscientific infor-
mation in risk assessment and to incorpo-
rate uncertainty into decision-making. If
this trend continues and is held to scientif-
ically rigorous standards, it should lead not
only to better regulatory decisions, but
should also encourage research that will
yield better understanding of health risks
from low-level exposures to chemicals in
the environment. Exploration of this last
issue will lead us to a discussion of how
risk assessment, properly conceived, can be
applied to a greater array of public health
problems than those associated with indus-
trial products and by-products.
RiskAssessment and Research
The typical question regulatory risk asses-
sors attempt to answer, the size ofthe pub-
lic health problem associated with expo-
sures to carcinogens and other toxic sub-
stances, is in theory subject to empirical
investigation. There are, however, serious
deficiencies in our available research tools,
so we are at present prevented from gather-
ing directly relevant scientific data (11). It
is nevertheless the case that substantial
progress is being made in both the experi-
mental and epidemiological sciences, and
several novel and potentially highly telling
methodologies are beingapplied to selected
problems. These efforts need both to be
encouraged and directed toward specific
public health objectives. The practice of
risk assessment, if it is not constrained by
unyielding adherence to standard regulato-
ry assumptions, can greatly assist the
achievement ofthese ends.
If risk assessors are free to explore the
full spectrum of inferences regarding
health risks that can be drawn from all
available data on specific chemicals, partic-
ularly those pertaining to their underlying
mechanisms of biological action, two use-
ful outcomes can be achieved. First, as
mentioned previously, the complete state
of present knowledge and its associated
uncertainties can be presented to risk man-
agers, and better informed regulations
should follow. But a possibly more impor-
tant goal might also be realized. I suggest
Environmental Health Perspectives 260...... _ .. . I ;
that there is no better guide to public
health research than a thoroughly elaborat-
ed risk assessment.
Risk assessment, as I suggest it should
be conceived, is a highly systematic means
for organizing available information and
knowledge and for specifying the degree of
scientific certainty associated with each of
the sets of data, models, and assumptions
that are needed to reach conclusions
regarding health risks of any type. In a
thoroughly realized risk assessment, the
significant gaps in information and knowl-
edge that limit understanding ofthe nature
and size ofthe public health problem being
explored are laid bare, and highly specific
lines of investigation that can advance
understanding are thereby suggested. Close
collaboration between risk assessors and
research scientists can immensely profit the
professional lives of both. To the extent
regulatory agencies encourage risk assessors
to explore the ramifications ofall available
data, no matter how incomplete (in the
manner suggested by the second group of
critics mentioned above), they will con-
tribute to the efforts of the research com-
munity to develop and apply methods that
will have a significant impact on our
understanding of the threats to public
health posed by chemical exposures and by
other environmental hazards as well.
Risk assessment is the means by which
currently available information about pub-
lic health problems arising in the environ-
ment is organized and understood. The
results ofa risk assessment, most specifical-
ly the analysis ofuncertainties contained in
any thorough assessment, point the way to
new research efforts. The results of these
new research efforts are used to increase
the accuracy of the risk assessment. The
cycle continues until we are satisfied that
our understanding ofthe nature and size of
the public health problem is sufficiently
complete.
Institutional mechanisms to ensure this
type of close collaboration between the
research and risk assessment communities
are not well established, although elements
of it are in evidence. Perhaps it is time to
consider more carefully how to create such
arrangements.
Toward a BroaderView ofRisk
Assessment
Risk assessment should primarily be seen as
a framework within which all available
information and knowledge pertaining to
the risk at hand can be organized in a high-
ly systematic way, with the objectives of
characterizing the nature and size of the
risk and ofspecifying the degree ofscientif-
ic certainty that can be attached to the var-
ious sets ofdata, models, and assumptions
used to produce the risk estimates. This
broad view of risk assessment, as against
the view that it involves only the applica-
tion of the specific sets of default options
adopted by regulatory agencies, is, in fact,
close to that put forth by the 1983
National Academy of Sciences report (1),
mentioned earlier. The members of the
NAS Committee that produced the report
recognized the need for standardized
default options (without these regulators
could reach no conclusions about risk or
would be tempted to adopt on a case-by-
case basis those assumptions that might
lead to the most convenient outcome) but
recommended that efforts be made to
explore all available data and alternative
assumptions. The committee's recommen-
dations did not go as far as those suggested
here, but certainly pointed in the same
direction (1).
Content ofRiskAssessment
Besides those advantages already men-
tioned, this broader conception of risk
assessment would seem to offer the advan-
tage that one can envision its application
to a broad array ofpublic health problems
of environmental origin. Before exploring
this possibility, it is useful to outline the
general framework for risk assessment pro-
posed by the NAS committee in 1983 and
widely adhered to since. Risk assessment
was seen as a four-step process. Although
some of the terms used to describe the
steps and their context came from the lan-
guage of chemical toxicology (because the
committee was primarily concerned with
such hazards), the analytic content ofeach
step, and the way in which the steps are
integrated, would seem to be applicable to
other types ofenvironmental threats.
Hazard identification is the name given
to step one. In the context ofchemical tox-
icity, this step involves identifying from
the available scientific literature the types
of toxic effects (nervous system damage,
birth defects, skin irritation, cancer, etc.)
that the chemical can cause or contribute
to. It also involves, as every step does, a full
characterization of the degree of scientific
certainty with which toxic effects observed
under certain conditions (e.g., in popula-
tions of exposed workers or in certain
species of laboratory animals) can be said
to hold for the population whose risks are
being assessed.
The second step of risk assessment
involves what the committee called
dose-response assessment. This term was bor-
rowed directly from the domain ofchemi-
cal toxicity, although it is also used in the
area ofradiation-induced risks. In this step
the risk assessor attempts to provide a
quantitative description, again with its
associated uncertainties, ofthe relationship
between the magnitude, duration, frequen-
cy, or even timing of the chemical expo-
sure and the severity or frequency ofoccur-
rence, or both, of the chemical's hazards
that is likely to hold in the range of doses
experienced by the population whose risk
is under assessment.
Now the risk assessor moves to step
three, the human exposure assessment: what
range of exposures is experienced by the
human population whose risk is being
assessed? Indeed, just what populations are
being evaluated, and how are exposures to
the chemical agent distributed within
them?
Having identified the types of hazards
associated with a chemical and how the
risks of those hazards occurring relate to
exposure, and having identified the expo-
sures actually experienced by the popula-
tions of interest, the risk assessor is ready
for step four, the risk characterization,
wherein the assessor describes the particu-
lar risks likely to be experienced by the
population of interest under its actual or
expected exposure conditions, based on the
information and analysis assembled in the
first three steps. Risk characterization
involves not only integration of knowl-
edge, but also a full exposition of the
degree of scientific certainty that can be
attached to that knowledge (1).
This broad four-step framework can in
theory be applied to all types of health
threats that arise in the environment. The
specific methodologies and assumptions to
be applied in each of the four steps will
vary according to the specific environmen-
tal agent(s) (see next section for a defini-
tion of this term) and the strength and
nature of available scientific data and our
general understanding of its effects on
human health. The general framework for
risk assessment outlined above is the cen-
tral organizing device under which the
available knowledge relevant to the partic-
ular environmental source of risk is
brought forward and evaluated by the risk
assessor. And, as in the case of chemical
threats, risk assessors should be encouraged
to use all available data and knowledge, to
explore the range ofpossible risks that can
be inferred from that data and knowledge,
and to describe the relative scientific merits
that each of the risk conclusions com-
mands. Risk assessments so conceived and
conducted can provide the same type of
guidance to research and contribution to
public health improvement for environ-
mental health threats of nonchemical ori-
gin as they can for chemical threats. The
development ofspecific methodologies will
take considerable effort, but several exam-
ples have been published (19,20). And, as
discussed below, risk assessment methods
for many types ofenvironmental agents, as
they shall be defined below, are already
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well worked out and have been applied for
many years.
Let us now move to a discussion ofthe
broad array of environmental health
threats that might be profitably explored
under this risk assessment framework.
Human Health and the
Environment
There is no single term (e.g., chemicals,
substances, materials, objects) adequate to
describe all components of the environ-
ment. I adopt the term "environmental
agents" for simplicity, recognizing that this
usage is not ordinary for many ofthe com-
ponents of the environment I describe.
Humans come into contact with their
environments in diverse ways. Many of
these contacts can harm human health,
that is, they can lead to physical injuries,
diseases, and deaths. Harm can take many
forms, can be permanent or impermanent,
and can manifest itself either at or shortly
after time of contact or after a period of
delay. As the term "environment" is
defined it follows that the risks of most
forms of human morbidity and mortality
are associated with components of the
environment.
Although it is true that the specific
causes of most forms of human morbidity
and mortality are poorly understood, it is
clear that many human exposures to agents
in our natural and manufactured environ-
ment increase the risks of disease and
death. Indeed, I think a case can be made
that the risks of most forms of human
morbidity and mortality are substantially
increased by exposures to environmental
agents, but making this case is outside the
scope of and unnecessary to the present
discussion.
The phrase "increase the risks of" is
adopted to avoid the problematic issue of
causation. Thus, the risk assessment dis-
cussion is directed to those environmental
agents that are the proximate contributors
to increased risks. In describing risks asso-
ciated, for example, with pathogenic
microorganisms (the proximate contribu-
tors), the risk assessment process is not
required to grapple with the issue of
whether the causes of those risks are the
organisms themselves, the conditions that
led to human exposure to them, some
genetic or host factors associated with the
individuals incurring the risks, or a combi-
nation ofall ofthese. To understand these
ultimate causes or sources is critically
important to our attempts to manage risks.
It is not critical to assessing the risks associ-
ated with human exposures to those envi-
ronmental agents that are the proximate
contributors to harm.
What are these environmental agents?
Five broad categories, each having many
members, can be identified: 1) natural and
synthetic chemicals, 2) radiation, 3) physi-
cal objects, 4) pathogenic organisms, and
5) substances used as nutrients. The view
ofwhat comprises the environment that is
reflected in this list is somewhat at odds
with the prevailing concepts of environ-
mental health, which focus primarily on
industrial products and byproducts. There
is much to be gained by adopting this
much broader view of environmental
health, and I hope its advantages emerge in
the discussion to follow.
These broad categories of agents each
contain members that, under some condi-
tions, can increase the risk of human
injury, disease, or death. As already men-
tioned, understanding what those condi-
tions are and the nature, magnitude, and
severity of the associated risks is for many
ofthese agents not readily achievable using
currently available scientific methods. But
these are exactly the circumstances in
which risk assessment comes most effec-
tively into play, especially ifit is conceived
as an analytic method for ordering avail-
able information, knowledge, and uncer-
tainties within a specific framework, using
the best available scientific tools, and not
as a set of rules set forth to meet specific
regulatory objectives. The framework is, of
course, the four-step analytic process out-
lined earlier; how it might be applied in
the broader context that includes all five
categories of environmental agents will be
reviewed in the following. A thorough dis-
cussion of possible applications is not
offered; I seek only to set the stage for
future embellishment.
Specific examples of subgroups of
agents in these five categories are listed in
Table 1. Note that many ofthe subgroups
listed contain numerous members. There
are, for example, almost countless types of
physical objects that are hazardous under
some conditions. Natural chemicals with
which people come into daily contact
number in the hundreds of thousands, if
not more: most ofthese are present as non-
nutritive constituents of the human diet
and most have yet to be chemically charac-
terized, let alone studied for their haz-
ardous properties (21).
It is probably safe to say that all of
these individual environmental agents (i.e.,
the specific category members) can, under
some conditions, increase the risk of
human injury, disease, or death. It is not
assumed that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between exposure to environ-
mental agents and specific risks of human
injury, disease, or death. While this may be
true for many cases (e.g., the risk ofdeath
from the physical trauma that occurs when
a pedestrian is hit by an automobile), it is
often the case that 1) exposures to many
different agents are necessary to increase
the risk ofa specific form ofharm, and 2)
the risk of a specific form of harm (e.g.,
liver cancer or kidney disease) may be
influenced by different environmental
agents or combinations thereof. It is also
Table 1. Five categories ofenvironmental agentsthat can be proximate contributorsto increased human health risks
Pathogenic agents Natural and synthetic chemicals Radiation Nutritional substances Physical objects
Many microorganisms Natural products (chemicals in foods, beverages, All forms ofionizing Constituents offoods Weapons
(bacteria, fungi, viruses, plants, animals, insects) and nonionizing radia- and beveragesthat Machinery/equipment/
parasites) Industrial products and by-products tion (including heat, are necessaryfor tools
Consumer products sound) nutrition Moving vehicles
Pesticides, agricultural chemicals Components of physical
Medicines, medical and diagnostic devices structures
Chemicals used for clothing, shelter, other physical Water
structures and objects Natural formation and
Tobacco and its combustion products products
Substances used forfuels and their combustion
products
Substances ofabuse
By-products and wastes from above
aSome subgroups contain many individual agents; naturally occurring chemicals in the diet probably make up the single largest subgroup of individual chemi-
cals. Distinctions are made between pathogenic microorganisms that cause harm by invading the body and growing there and those that produce chemical tox-
ins outside the body that cause harm when ingested; the latter are in the group of natural chemical products. Similarly, though the constituents of physical
objects are all chemicals, the agents of harm are the objects themselves, and the harm they may create (usually some form of physical trauma) is not related to
the hazards oftheir chemical components.
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true that the nature and risk of harm
occurring in exposed individuals will some-
times be influenced by certain factors, typi-
cally genetic ones, specific to those individ-
uals, and that what constitutes a "risky
exposure" for one individual will not be so
for another (5).
Knowledge regarding the relationships
between exposures to environmental agents
and the risks they may increase is acquired
in several ways. Common human experi-
ence and direct observation are the typical
sources of information for many agents,
especially when exposures to those agents
are readily apparent to the senses and when
they lead to easily recognizable injuries.
Physical traumas resulting from accidents,
natural disasters, warfare, or crime, and
acute poisonings from certain highly toxic
chemicals are examples of situations
involving this means of acquiring knowl-
edge. Actuaries are among the principal
compilers of relevant data. In other cases
careful scientific study is needed, often
involving a combination of epidemiologi-
cal and experimental work. Linking expo-
sures to specific forms of morbidity and
mortality through scientific study can
sometimes be straightforward, but is often
exceedingly difficult, especially when the
manifestations ofharm are delayed, require
long-term exposures, or are significantly
affected by host factors. Among the latter
exposures are those to chemical agents that
may increase cancer risk or that of other
chronic diseases, or exposure to nutrients
that can increase the risk of coronary dis-
ease (1,11).
In theory, the hazardous properties of
the environmental agents will become
manifest only ifhuman exposures to them
exceed some level, although it is possible
that for some of them any exposure will
increase risk. (How those exposures are
measured and expressed will vary according
to the agent.) Note that for the nutrients,
failure to achieve a minimum level ofexpo-
sure may also be harmful. In any case,
understanding the relationships between
exposures and the manifestation of harm
(measured as incidence, number of cases,
severity of effect or in other terms) is the
risk assessor's goal. There is in theory no
reason why this goal cannot be achieved
for any environmental agent, although we
are obviously very far from doing so. Ifthe
risk assessor can also acquire knowledge of
how exposures are distributed in the
human population (again using the mea-
sures ofexposures appropriate to the agent
of interest), then this information can be
integrated with the hazard and exposure-
risk information to characterize the associ-
ated health risk. This last step, risk charac-
terization, also contains a summary of the
significant uncertainties.
This all sounds relatively straightfor-
ward, but, ofcourse, actual execution will
be difficult. For many environmental
agents, however, it is no more fraught
with uncertainty than the current
approach to carcinogen risk assessment,
and for many categories ofagents it is far
more certain.
If risk assessment is conceived as a
framework for systematic organization of
available knowledge, then we can begin to
develop a comprehensive picture ofthe rel-
ative risks posed by agents in the environ-
ment. Moreover, and this is perhaps the
most important consequence of the
approach suggested here, we shall become
better equipped to identify the specific
gaps in data and knowledge that, when
filled, can most effectively reduce uncer-
tainties. Ifwe see as a major goal ofpublic
health research the development of an
accurate understanding of the magnitudes
ofvarious environmental threats to human
health, then risk assessment can be an
effective element ofthat research program,
whether it concerns risks from foodborne
microbes, automobile accidents, radon,
pesticides, or dietary fat.
The Needs ofthe RiskManager
The creation ofa systematic understanding
of public health threats arising from the
environment that can be achieved through
the development of comprehensive risk
assessments directs attention to those
sources of risk that, if reduced, will yield
the greatest public health benefits. Risk
assessment can also be applied in a predic-
tive manner and can provide information
about the possible harms associated with
the introduction ofnew technologies. Risk
assessment does not, ofcourse, reveal how
these sources ofrisk can be effectively man-
aged. To achieve the latter requires knowl-
edge ofthe conditions that bring about the
exposures that create the risks and of the
means available to alter those conditions in
beneficial ways. But once the risk assess-
ment framework is in place, equally sys-
tematic means can be developed to identify
those conditions that may create excessive
risks and to evaluate the relative effective-
ness of various forms of intervention
(everything from regulations, to warnings,
to education, to economic incentives, to
law enforcement, to medical measures, to
political pressures). These risk manage-
ment objectives are beyond the present dis-
cussion, but it seems clear that they can be
pursued with the same kind ofrigor I sug-
gest can be applied to the risk assessment
process.
Strengths and Limits ofRisk
Assessment as aPolicy Guide
A premise of this paper is that public
health resources should be devoted to
reducing risks in at least rough proportion
to the toll they take on human health, and
risk assessment would seem to be the tool
used to assign risks their rightful order.
Seen from this perspective, risk assessment
should be a principal component ofpublic
health and regulatory programs every-
where. Risk management approaches will
differ, perhaps greatly, depending on local
laws and customs, the availability of tech-
nical skills and the resources to deploy
them, and political prerogatives. But estab-
lishing the relative needs for risk reduction
programs, by continuing pursuit of com-
prehensive assessments ofrisks, should be a
universal objective, and we as scientists
should be willing to share our data, knowl-
edge, and experiences to assist each other
in achieving it.
We also need to work to convince gov-
ernments and citizens that public health
objectives should be consistent with the
best available scientific and medical knowl-
edge regarding the relative threats to our
health and well being ofthe many risks we
face and should not be established primari-
ly upon the politically attractive trends of
the moment.
Although this principle may seem the
correct one to those of us concerned with
the problem ofidentifying and characteriz-
ing health risks, certain social and cultural
issues that may run contrary to it need to
be considered. First, it is apparent from
many studies that people's perceptions of
risk often do not match those of the
experts (22). In fact, when it comes to
describing risks, most people do not give
the probability that an adverse outcome
will occur (the principal concern of the
technical expert) as much weight as many
other features of the risk, most of which
are not (and should not) be considered by
the risk assessor. Thus, it is clear that most
people feel greater anxiety about low-prob-
ability events with catastrophic outcomes
(such as an airplane crash) than they do
about riskier activities that take one or a
few lives at a time (such as automobile
accidents). People want to accept no risk,
no matter how tiny, unless they perceive
that the risky activity or exposure provides
some recognizable personal benefit. Risks
imposed by others are less well tolerated
than those voluntarily assumed. Risks that
scientists do not understand well, and over
which they may publicly squabble, are
more feared than those about which scien-
tific consensus is strong. If the risk is of
natural origin it is somehow less threaten-
ing than if it is one created by human
beings. There are many more attributes of
a risk that influence people's perceptions of
it and the intensity ofthe concern they feel
about it (10,22.
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Observations by social psychologists
help us understand why people and their
governments seem much more anxious
about, and willing to act against, some rel-
atively small risks that may be associated
with certain types ofenvironmental agents,
such as certain industrial chemicals and
pollutants, whereas they take a more
relaxed attitude about risks that scientists
recognize as more important from a public
health perspective. This is not to say that
health risks from industrial products and
by-products are to be ignored-indeed,
some are ofsignificant concern and require
controls-but only that the risks created
by many such products are often perceived
as much greater than they actually are.
Another factor complicating our efforts
to devote resources to various risks to the
public health in proportion to their actual
impact pertains to the options available for
controlling different sources of risk. Many
large risks, such as those due to smoking,
alcohol abuse, and poor nutrition, require
intensive, multifaceted, and often long-
term efforts to influence the public's atti-
tudes and to reallocate resources. Speci-
fying and enforcing regulatory limits on
benzene emissions from a petroleum refin-
ery or mercury levels in fish is a far easier
undertaking (notwithstanding the fact that
the economic consequences for manufac-
turers or fishermen might be quite severe).
So in many societies risk reduction priori-
ties are often based on the relative ease
with which risk reduction objectives may
be achieved, and this sometimes has poor
correspondence to the public health
importance ofthe risks being attacked (1).
Other factors place more emphasis on
small, less well-known risks than on large,
well-documented ones. Not least of these
are the various food, drug, consumer prod-
uct, environmental, and occupational laws
that our legislatures have passed. These
laws presumably reflect broad social con-
cerns, not least ofwhich are public percep-
tions of the type discussed above. Most
food safety laws, for example, insist that we
need to be highly risk averse when we pur-
posefully add a substance to food, while
they remain relatively silent on the much
larger risks associated with natural compo-
nents of the diet (8). Regulatory agencies
everywhere have been denied opportunities
to do much about tobacco use. These are
but two examples of policies that do not
reflect current scientific understanding, but
which are based on other social values.
For these and several other reasons, not
least of which concern the facts that
experts do not always agree on the scientif-
ic issues and that we do a wholly inade-
quate job in public education on these
matters, we shall no doubt continue to see
public health and regulatory priorities
based on factors other than relative risk. It
would nevertheless seem essential that
those ofus involved in risk assessment con-
tinue to seek the development of the data
necessary to improve our understanding of
risks to our health and safety (while con-
tinuing to debate just what types of data
and knowledge we can best use) and to
press government officials and the publics
they serve to work toward risk-based prior-
ities. And, although we need also to accept
that these priorities will vary among differ-
ent societies, there is no reason we should
not work among ourselves toward a com-
mon approach to organizing and evaluat-
ing risk information so that, as in other
areas of science, a uniform international
language will exist to facilitate exchange of
information and ideas.
The next step might be a concerted
movement to broaden the scope of risk
assessment, as well as to revise our thinking
about how risk assessment should be
approached, so that we can begin to assem-
ble a comprehensive profile of the relative
risks to human health posed by the large
number ofenvironmental agents, both nat-
ural and manufactured, to which humans
are exposed.
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